Abstract. When estimating the political determinants of the federal budget, scholars face a choice between using measures of funding and measures of spending as their outcome of interest. We examine the consequences of this choice. In particular, we argue that spending outcomes may serve as a poor test of the research questions scholars seek to answer, since spending data conflate competing budgetary influences, are downstream measures of the appropriations that originated them, and induce measurement error. To test our claim, we compare the spending data used in a recent study (Berry and Fowler 2016: American Journal of Political Science 60 (3): 692–708) with an original data set of military construction appropriations. While an analysis of the spending data produces a null result, the same analysis using the appropriations data provides strong evidence that legislators use their committee positions to distribute pork. Our findings have broad implications for studies that use measures of spending in the congressional and presidency literatures.
(Replication materials available here.)
Abstract. In the United States, state and local governments receive over $700 billion annually in federal grants, yet relatively little is known about how Congress designs these programs. I formalize a theory of congressional bargaining over grants and test the theory using an original dataset of Senate amendments. The results suggest that congressional rules and political considerations shape, and at times distort, federal grant programs. While grant programs may be intended to improve education or provide healthcare, I find that members of Congress treat these programs as opportunities to procure more funding for their constituents. Further, I show how coalitions are shaped by the status quo policy and the distribution of population, poverty, and other measures of need across states. These results have important implications for our understanding of the policymaking process and the effectiveness of federal programs.
Abstract. Particularistic politics in the U.S. Congress are often criticized for enabling wasteful spending. This paper reexamines this claim, focusing on a prevalent, but often overlooked, type of policy: grants-in-aid. These grants to state and local governments are allocated using statutory formulas based on population, poverty, and other state characteristics. As a result, a formula designed to benefit one state also benefits similar states. I compile decades of data on federal education grant programs and use variation in the timing of program reauthorizations to estimate the political determinants of grants. I find that states represented by members of key committees, and particularly committee chairs, disproportionately benefit from grants-in-aid. However, other states with similar characteristics also benefit, sometimes more than the states represented by the committee chairs. These results suggest that pork barrel politics, when combined with formulas, can effectively provide assistance to people in need.
Abstract. Congress has experienced an increase in dysfunction, gridlock and polarization over the past several decades. While no doubt there are numerous causes behind these maladies, we hypothesize that the politicization of congressional capacity plays an important role. By this, we mean that the funding and staffing of congressional committees has become increasingly political, instead of being based primarily upon expertise or need. This paper explores changes in committee capacity in two ways. We first examine the broader context of committee resource allocation through several decades of House and Senate disbursement reports, exploring how political considerations may influence the allocation of budget and personnel resources within Congress. Then, we propose a novel data set that uses House and Senate telephone directories to track the employment and movement within Congress of all House and Senate staffers from 1977 to 2018. We present initial results from a subset of these data and note evidence of emerging trends.