Measuring the Influence of Political Actors on the Federal Budget

with Ben Hammond. 2020, American Political Science Review.

Abstract. When estimating the political determinants of the federal budget, scholars face a choice between using measures of funding and measures of spending as their outcome of interest. We examine the consequences of this choice. In particular, we argue that spending outcomes may serve as a poor test of the research questions scholars seek to answer, since spending data conflate competing budgetary influences, are downstream measures of the appropriations that originated them, and induce measurement error. To test our claim, we compare the spending data used in a recent study (Berry and Fowler 2016: American Journal of Political Science 60 (3): 692–708) with an original data set of military construction appropriations. While an analysis of the spending data produces a null result, the same analysis using the appropriations data provides strong evidence that legislators use their committee positions to distribute pork. Our findings have broad implications for studies that use measures of spending in the congressional and presidency literatures.

(Replication materials available here.)

Working Papers

Congressional Bargaining and the Distribution of Grants

Abstract. In the U.S., over $540 billion in grants is allocated annually based on formulas written by Congress. While scholars have long been interested in how the federal government distributes funding, little is known about how Congress designs these formulas. I formalize a theory of bargaining over grants wherein legislators attempt to increase funding for their states, and provide empirical evidence consistent with the theory. The structure of grant programs imposes additional constraints, which can lead to certain legislators being cheaper to include in the winning coalition, positive distributions outside of the winning coalition, oversized winning coalitions, and retention of the status quo policy. In line with theories of distributive politics, I also find evidence that authorizing committee members are able to procure more grant funding for their states. These results have implications for understanding the congressional policymaking process as well as for the effectiveness of federal grant programs.

The Politicization of Congressional Capacity

with Nathan Gibson and Ben Hammond

Abstract. Congress has experienced an increase in dysfunction, gridlock and polarization over the past several decades. While no doubt there are numerous causes behind these maladies, we hypothesize that the politicization of congressional capacity plays an important role. By this, we mean that the funding and staffing of congressional committees has become increasingly political, instead of being based primarily upon expertise or need. This paper explores changes in committee capacity in two ways. We first examine the broader context of committee resource allocation through several decades of House and Senate disbursement reports, exploring how political considerations may influence the allocation of budget and personnel resources within Congress. Then, we propose a novel data set that uses House and Senate telephone directories to track the employment and movement within Congress of all House and Senate staffers from 1977 to 2018. We present initial results from a subset of these data and note evidence of emerging trends.